What is this chart you speak of, you're asking of course. Well I'll gladly tell you - it's the rule of thumb that coaches go by when determining the appropriate time to go for a two-point conversion after a touchdown instead of kicking the extra point.
The standard rule in going for two is to only go for it when you're nearing the fourth quarter or actually in the fourth. Otherwise, according to many people who support the chart, you become obsessed with chasing points and missing out on a guaranteed point when going for two is such a risk.
I am here to put my full support behind burning this so-called "chart" and tell you why I don't have a problem with teams breaking the conventional "wisdom" of not going for two until the latter stages of the game.
Origins of "The Chart"
Before I actually started this piece, I decided to Google the words "two point conversion chart" just to see if there was an actual chart or if this was some brilliant scheme hatched by play-by-play and game analysts to convince us that there is a right and a wrong time to go for two-points.
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| Dick Vermeil's chart |
I believe the chart is good in theory, but its standard use by coaches, especially in the NFL, is what I find problematic. Most coaches by nature are too conservative and for whatever reason (whether it's a fear of losing out on a sure point or a fear of being critiqued for a failed two-point conversion by the media) just don't want to take a chance to go for two, even if it means that the potential conversion would either tie the game or put you up by a score that could be achieved in one play by the opposing team (i.e. going for two when up by 1 to go up a field goal or when up by 5 to go up by a touchdown).
If you notice, coaches usually only go for two in the late stretches of games in this particular situations, not in the second quarter of games as a team tonight did (read below for that).
The Death of Two-Pointers in NCAA
What surprises me (or perhaps it shouldn't) is that the use of the two-point conversion has actually gone down in the NCAA since then, according to an NCAA article from 2008 about the subject: 50th anniversary of 2-point conversion
This particular article shows that the use of the two-point conversion has gone down from an all-time high of over 51% of all touchdowns in 1958 (the first instance of the two-point conversion being used as a possibility to follow touchdowns) to an al-time low of only 5% of touchdowns being followed by a two-point attempt in 2007
There could be several reasons for this:
- NCAA Overtime didn't exist until 1996. Therefore, teams who didn't want to tie a game would be more likely to take a risk on a two-point conversion in order to go for the win as opposed to settling for the tie. Now, since there can't be any ties, there is less incentive now than there was in the period preceding the overtime rules in going for the win.
- Coaches have become more concerned with how taking such a "risk" might look to media looking for any little thing to blast the coach about should such conversions fail.
- The success rate for the conversions isn't high enough for coaches to justify going for two unless they have to.
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| From the article linked above - the use of 2-pt conversions since its advent in 1958 |
Out of those reasons, the chart, as it's best described during a game by the play-by-play and game analysts, best fits into the third category - minimizing risk of losing points for the sake of chasing for that extra point too early.
After all, why should you go for two-point conversions when you're up by one point in the second quarter when so many more possessions in the game remain for you to score. Why risk the two-point conversion when the chances of making an extra-point via kick are way more safe?
NFL writer Michael Lombardi is a big proponent of the chart, as evidenced by the article he wrote last year on the subject. I will not disagree with him on the math part of going for two versus going for one (since 2006, PAT kicks are made on average between 98.3 and 99.5% of the time, whereas the 300 attempts of going for two during that time succeeded at a 45.7% clip - thus justifying, in Lombardi's eyes, not going for two until you absolutely have to). To be worth the risk in the long-run, you'd need to convert the two-point conversion as least half as much as you would the PAT (since the kick is worth half as much). I can see that to some degree, but....
The elements I disagree with him and others about when it comes to the use of two-point conversions and strictly sticking to the chart:
- Why does it need to be a particular point in the game when you should "follow the chart" when going for two? Just because the percentages of how two-point conversions have historically done shouldn't be the end-all, be-all in deciding that two-pointers aren't worth the risk until the fourth quarter.
I was following a game this afternoon where the Buffalo Bills were trailing 28-20 mid-way through the third quarter. After scoring a touchdown to go down by 2, I figured they might attempt a two-point conversion so they can tie the game - they didn't. They kicked the extra point to cut the lead to 28-27. The Bills went on to score another TD and didn't go for two again, although at that point I expected it even though a two-pointer could give them a full-touchdown lead as opposed to two field goals.
But Brian, if they miss the two-pointer in either of those situations, they are losing out on a point that could help them later in the game. If they miss the conversion when scoring and up by 5, they'll be leaving themselves exposed to losing because the other team could kick two field goals and win.
Well, the Bills took a 34-28 lead into the fourth quarter and never scored another point. However, the Tennessee Titans did - via a touchdown with about a minute left that gave them the 1-point win.
On the other hand, the Pittsburgh Steelers went for two against the Bengals in the second quarter after a touchdown put them down 14-12. They went on to convert it and ended up winning the game 24-17. The conversion didn't end up playing a role in the final score as much as the non-conversion did with Tennessee. But it would have had the Bengals ended up scoring a touchdown in the waning part of the game (as the Titans did). The Bengals would have been forcing overtime if they scored, which is what the Titans didn't need to do because of the Bills not going for two after two touchdowns in the third. - If you have the chance to tie a game, do it, no matter the time of game. Yes, the math of conversions may not benefit the two-point conversion in general, but I believe they should be attempted more frequently and earlier in games.
The worry that coaches and media personalities stress when going for two early in games is that you are "chasing points", which shouldn't be done if you have many more possessions left in a game to achieve more scores.
However, who's to say that the Steelers, who were down by two in the second quarter after scoring a touchdown, might not score the rest of regulation time? Even though they may have 7-10 more possessions, there's no guarantee that they are able to find the end zone or have another scoring opportunity in the game again.
Hell, it practically happened to the Bengals at that point in the game - they'd only go on to score three more points. Giving yourself the best chance to win might not always be by following the math of PAT vs. two point risk, but rather letting game situations at any point in the game (not just the fourth quarter) dictate your move after a touchdown is scored.
In the situation described in Lombardi's story from last year, he mentioned the Packers going for two (and failing) when a touchdown put them up by 1 with about 18 game minutes left. He believes that the fourth quarter should be the only time a two-point conversion should be attempted, but if that ends up being the last score the Packers have in regulation, a one-point lead is essentially the same as a two-point lead (not taking into account a safety, which should never really be considered a serious scoring option for any team).
After all, if the opposing team kicks a field goal in the Packers situation, they're up by a point in the situations where an XP is kicked prior to that (as the Titans were today) or up by two if the two point conversion fails. If the two-pointer is attempted and then converted, this gives the team added insurance should they be shutout in the final quarter and their opponent scores the necessary score (field goal or touchdown) to tie the game.
You best believe that had the Steelers missed the two-pointer, you would have heard critiques of the choice to "chase points" by the guys in the booth. In fact, I heard Cris Collinsworth make a comment about not agreeing with Mike Tomlin's choice to go for two before the attempt. His voice would have taken on a paternal "you should know better" tone if the conversion failed - and especially if the Steelers would have gone on to lose by only a point.
It's the conservative nature of coaches and the media perpetrating this myth to new heights that allows for this "chart" to have its place only in the fourth quarter of games.
If I have the time (or had the time - we'll see if I can really get to doing this), I'll try seeing how often teams are in the Bills position of trailing by eight in the early-to-mid stages in a game and NOT going for two after scoring a touchdown to see how often they end up losing by one.
For now, I will remain a proponent of trying to tie the game or expanding your lead to a standard score (i.e. attempting a two pointer when up by 1 so you can go up by a field goal) whenever you get the opportunity to after a touchdown, and you (nor some stupid chart) can't convince me otherwise.
